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NOTES AND COMMENT
AESTHETIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE LAW.
The courts have often been called upon to decide cases in which
aesthetic considerations form the basis of the appeal to the police
power. The rule is that the police power cannot be used to promote
beauty or for asthetic purposes. In this respect, the United States
is not as progressive as the more important European countries. The
Europeans' appreciation and development of beauty is not hindered
by constitutional restrictions as it is in the United States.
England in 1913 passed an act entitled "Ancient Monuments
Consolidation and Amendment Act" 1 which provided for the pres-
ervation of objects of beauty. In the same year France had an
act passed 2 which provided for the classification of real property,
the conservation of which is desirable, by the Minister of Fine Arts
to the Council of State. The act regulates the sale of such prop-
erty, its removal or repairs. The Minister of Fine Arts can ex-
propriate property classified or proposed for classification. For
many years German states have authorized ordinances concerning
municipal asthetics. Laws have been passed to prevent disfigure-
ment of public places; special requirements have been made with
regard to the appearance of buildings in certain localities; and the
evils of outdoor advertising have been suppressed. Other countries
as Switzerland and Austria have followed the lead of Germany.
Italy, ever since the fifteenth century, has had laws to protect her
works of art, and Japan has a law protecting the beauty of land-
scapes and historical monuments.3
Can we say Americans are not as anxious for aesthetic develop-
ment as are the Europeans? Such an interest is the only explana-
tion of the growth of aesthetic considerations under eminent domain.
In former times, it was felt that land could be taken only to be
used by the public for necessary and useful purposes and not for
public pleasure and asthetic gratification. Inroads have been made
on all sides upon this doctrine, partly by general acquiescence and
partly by judicial decisions, until all that is left of it is the possi-
bility that in a close case lack of material advantage to the public
may be held to be decisive against the public nature of a taking.4
Is a use public which satisfies no material need but "gratifies
the artistic sense of the public or supplies means for public pleasure
or recreation"? 5 In a Connecticut case,6 the Court said, "What is
1III and IV George V, c. 32, p. 178. Section 22 defines "Ancient Monu-
ments" to include "monuments, the preservation of which is a matter of public
interest by reason of the historic, traditional, artistic or archological interest
attaching thereto."
"'Law with Regard to Historic Monuments."
. See WILLIAmS, LAW OF CITY PLANNING AND ZONING (N. Y. 1922) p. 396.
' NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) p. 162.
" Ibid.
IOlmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 551 (1866).
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the exact line between public and private uses? * * * The power
[eminent domain] requires a degree of elasticity to be capable of
meeting new conditions and improvements and the ever increasing
necessities of society. The sole dependence must be on the pre-
sumed wisdom of the sovereign authority, supervised and in cases
of gross error or extreme wrong controlled by the dispassionate
judgment of the Courts."
Two cases, Farist Steel Co. v. Boidgeport 7 and Bunyan v.
Commissioners of Palisades Interstate Park,8 illustrate this point.
The Court in the first case said that where a harbor line was estab-
lished solely in order that an expensive bridge might not be hidden
from view by buildings placed on each side of it, it was not a public
use for which lands could be taken. In the later case we find that
a New York statute 9 provided for the establishment of the Pali-
sades Interstate Park. The Court held that the taking of a stone
quarry along the Palisades of the Hudson and adjoining the state
park, was a taking for a public use even though the land itself
was so rugged as not to be adapted for use as a park. The Court
said,10 "The shutting down of this quarry and the removal of its
accessories do present some opportunity for adornment and im-
provement of scenic beauty, so that the courts must hold that the
land is adaptable to a public use."
It is difficult to reconcile these two cases but if we remember
that the first case was decided in 189111 and the Palisades case in
1915,12 we can see the application of the statement by the Court
in the above-mentioned case of Olmstead' v. Camp.13 But even
prior to that case which was decided in 1866, we had a case in New
York in 1836 14 in which it was held that private property could
be taken from individuals to be converted into a public square and
the damage could be assessed upon the owners of adjoining property.
In 1856 the selectmen of a Vermont town laid out a highway
through private lands adjacent to the court house and town hall.
It was held 15 that the highway could be laid out to ornament and
improve the looks of the public buildings though the highway could
not be established "for the purpose of embellishment alone or
mainly."
-60 Conn. 278, 22 Atl. 561 (1891).
'170 App. Div. 941, 153 N. Y. Supp. 622 (3rd Dept. 1915).
'N. Y. Laws (1900) c. 170; amended by N. Y. Laws (1906) c. 691; fur-
ther amended by N. Y. Laws (1910) c. 361.
"0 Supra note 8.
1 Supra note 7.
" Supra note 8.
" Supra note 6.
1, Owners of Ground v. Albany, 15 Wend. 374 (N. Y. 1836).
11 Woodstock v. Gallup, 28 Vt. 587 (1856).
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In the same year as Olmstead v. Camp 16 the case of Higginson
v. Nahant 17 held valid the laying out of a highway by eminent domain
which was "capable of being used for no purpose of business or
duty, and leading to no other major landing place," but was laid
out for the public solely to reach places of "pleasing natural scenery."
In Massachusetts the construction of "public use" is broad. An
act of Massachusetts of 1898 limited buildings in the neighborhood
of Copley Square, Boston, to a certain height, providing at the same
time for the payment of compensation to those property owners
who should suffer by the limitation. In the case of Attorney General
v. Williams Is the act was upheld as an exercise of the power of
eminent domain, and the principal question discussed by the Court
was whether the use could be regarded as public. The Court said,
"It is agreed by the defendants that the legislature in passing the
statute was seeking to preserve the architectural symmetry of Copley
Square. If this is a fact, and if the statute is merely for the benefit
of individual property owners, the purpose does not justify the tak-
ing of a right in land against the will of its owner. But if the
legislature for the benefit of the public was seeking to promote
the beauty and attractiveness of a public park in the capital of the
commonwealth, and to prevent unreasonable encroachment upon the
light and air which it had previously received, we cannot say that
the law-making power might not determine that this was a matter
of such public interest as to call for an expenditure of public money,
and to justify the taking of private property."
A New York statute provided for the addition of a twenty-
foot strip to each side of a portion of a Brooklyn avenue, the strips
being reserved as ornamental courtyards for -the benefit and im-
provement of the avenue. It was held,' 9 "It is not necessary that
every part of all highways should be used for the passage of vehicles
and pedestrians; it is proper that some regard be had for the Wsthetic
tastes, the comfort, the health, and the convenience of the public,
and if the Legislature had enacted that Clinton Avenue should be
increased in width to the extent provided in this act, and had pro-
vided that a strip in the center of the highway, forty feet wide,
should be devoted to trees and flowers, as is done in many of our
cities, it would hardly have been questioned that this constituted a
public use in the same sense that a park preserve is generally recog-
nized as a public use." 20
' Supra note 6.
"11 Allen 530 (N. Y. 1866).
' 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77 (1899); see William v. Parker, 188 U. S.
491, 23 Sup. Ct. 440 (1903).
" In re Clinton Ave., 57 App. Div. 166, 68 N. Y. Supp. 196 (2d Dept.
1901).
Today the right to acquire land for parks by condemnation is unques-
tioned. In declaring this right and upholding a statute limiting the height of
buildings around Copley Square in Boston, the Supreme Court of Massachu-
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In a Colorado case there is involved the question whether the
use of Cascade Canyon, for a summer resort was a "beneficial use."
The Court held,21 "We say that the creation of a summer resort is
a beneficial use. Is it of no benefit to the public to spend money
in making a beautiful place in nature visible and enjoyable? If a
person takes a stream, and after putting in waterfalls, ponds, bridges,
walls, shrubbery, and blue grass sod, works it into a beautiful home,
that is a beneficent use. It is a benefit to the weary, ailing and
feeble that they can have the wild beauties of nature placed at their
convenient disposal."
In the use of the power of eminent domain many states have
reached the point where private property may be condemned solely
for aesthetic purposes.22  But if aesthetic considerations are neces-
sary ones in our society then the means of promoting them must
be enlarged.23 Mr. Chandler in an article entitled "Attitude of the
Law toward Beauty" 24 says, "Naturally the recognition of beauty
as an element to justify the exercise of police power, which regu-
lates without direct compensatibn to the person limited, has lagged
after its recognition in the field of eminent domain where damages
are paid. The police power is always drastic; whatever burden it
entails, the individual has to bear alone, and the courts, therefore,
are cautious about imposing it. At the same time the regulation
of the use of private property in the interest of beauty is so gen-
eral in its application that if it is to be done effectively, it must
be done under the police power. We might as well try to conserve
health and safety by eminent domain as to conserve beauty in that
way.")
But can we conserve beauty under the police power? The
question whether mere ugliness not involving any consideration of
decency can be placed under police restraint has hardly advanced
beyond the range of tentative discussion.2 5
setts recognized the aesthetic considerations involved, saying in the Williams
case that parks "are expected to minister, not only to the grosser sense, but
also to the love of the beautiful in nature, in the varied forms which the
changing seasons bring."
Cascade Town Co. v. Empire Water Co., 181 Fed. 1011, 1017 (C. C. D.
Colo. 1910).
'1 NicHOLS, 10c. cit. supra note 4: "From the earliest times public
money has been spent to make public buildings attractive, and under Amer-
ican constitutions it has long been considered proper for the nation, state
or city to erect memorial halls, monuments, and statues, and to plan public
buildings upon a more expensive scale than if designed for utility alone
[supra note 18]. The public mind has thus been educated to feel that
aesthetic and artistic gratification are purposes public enough to justify the
expenditure of public money, and to authorize the exercise of eminent domain
in behalf of similar purposes was but a short step beyond."
'American Bar Association Journal, VIII (Aug., 1922) 472.
24 Ibid.
IFREUND, POLICE POWER (1904) p. 158. The various forms of offen-
siveness over which the police power is exercised do not as yet include unsightly
objects.
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One of the classic definitions of Police Power is that of Chief
Justice Shaw, given in his opinion in Commonwealth v. Alger.26
Chief Justice Shaw in that case says, "We think it is a settled prin-
ciple, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that
every owner of property, however absolute and unqualified may be
his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall
not be injurious to the general enjoyment of others having an equal
right to the enjoyment of their property, not injurious to the rights
of the community. All property in this Commonwealth is * * *
held subject to those general regulations which are to the common
good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social
and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations
in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious and
to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as
the legislature, under the Constitution, may think necessary and
expedient. This is very different from the right of eminent domain,
-the right of a government to take and appropriate private prop-
erty whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done
only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor.
The power we allude to is rather the police power; the power vested
in the legislature by the Constitution to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordi-
nances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the con-
stitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of
the Commonwealth and of the subjects of the same."
We must remember, however, that the police power is limited.
To constitute a valid exercise of the so-called police power of the
State, there must be shown some public advantage to be gained by
thus interfering with the personal liberty and property rights of
the individual. 27
Is the development of aesthetics such public advantage? The
author answers emphatically in the affirmative. As yet no judicial
body of the State or of the United States has been progressive
enough to uphold the exercise of the police power on the theory
that the development of asthetics constitutes a public advantage.
In 1905, in Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting Co.,28 the Court
says, "Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indul-
gence rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone that jus-
tifies the exercise of the police power to take private property with-
out compensation. In Illinois, a statute was passed forbidding the
erection of any advertising sign within five hundred feet of a park
or boulevard. The Supreme Court held it illegal 29 saying that mat-
ters of taste could not be regulated by statute when not connected
'7 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1851).
-2 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1910) p. 1231.
"72 N. J. L. 285, 62 Atl. 267 (1905).
'Sign Works v. Training School, 249 II. 436, 94 N. E. 920 (1911).
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with the safety, comfort, health, morals and natural welfare of
the people and that the citizen was free to determine the architec-
ture of his house and the appearance of his property for himself,
even though the result might be shocking to the aesthetic taste.
This case was followed by the case of Thomas C sack Co. v.
City of Chicago.30 The ordinance of the city of Chicago forbid-
ding the erection of signboards in residential blocks without the
consent of the owners of a majority of the frontage was the sub-
ject of litigation in both the State and United States Supreme
Courts and both held it valid. But the ground upon which they
did so was not that signboai-ds were a defacement, but that they
were dangerous. They might be torn down by the wind and injure
somebody, they increase the risk of fire and other fantastic argu-
ment that billboards are a menace to public safety. The United
States Supreme Court said that "the prohibition of billboards in
residence districts was justified in the interest of safety, morality,
health and decency of the community." Aesthetic considerations
were completely ignored. In that case and the cases following we
see the Court not willing to acknowledge beauty as a justification
for the exercise of the police power, but without admitting it they
are more and more giving weight to the consideration of the de-
velopment of aesthetics. They may profess to put their decisions
on other grounds but in their hearts it is the directing motive.
In Florida, in the same year as the Cusack case,31 an ordinance
appeared to have been passed for purely asthetic reasons and it was
held 8 2 invalid and unconstitutional.
There are several cases in New York similar to the Cusack
case and the -Court of Appeals has distinguished them from cases
involving laws passed for aesthetic purposes 33 and held that they
were in no way inconsistent with the general rule that asthetic
considerations alone could not be a ground for taking private prop-
erty under the police power.3
4
- 267 Ill. 344, 108 N. E. 340, aff'd, 242 U. S. 526, 37 Sup. Ct. 190 (1917). In
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567 (1909) in upholding the consti-
tutionality of the Boston height limitations, Mr. Justice Peckham held constitu-
tional the use of the police power to limit the height of buildings in Boston on
the ground of danger from fire and said "That in addition to these sufficient
facts, considerations of an westhetic nature also entered into the reasons for
their passage would not invalidate them."
1Ibid.
'Anderson v. Shackelford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 So. 343 (1917).
City of Rochester v. West, 164 N. Y. 510, 58 N. E. 673 (1900) ; Gunning
System v. City of Buffalo, 75 App. Div. (N. Y.) 31 (4th Dept. 1902) ; Whit-
mier and Filbrick Co. v. City of Buffalo, 118 Fed. 773 (C. C. W. D. N. Y.
1902).
"Supra note 28; Crawford v. City of Topeka, 51 Kan. 756, 33 Pac. 476
(1893) ; State v. Whitlock, 149 N. C. 542, 63 S. E. 123 (1908) ; Curran Bill
Posting Co. v. City of Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910); People
ex rel. Wineburgh Adv. Co. v. Murphy. 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N. E. 17 (1909).
This case involved an ordinance of New York City which limited the height of
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Whenever it is clearly shown that the object of the ordinance
is to relieve conditions and not to satisfy the artistic taste of some
of the community it will be upheld.35
In People v. City of Chicago 6 the Supreme Court of Illinois
has held against the right of a city to prevent the establishment of
retail stores in a residential section saying that there is nothing in-
herently dangerous to the health or safety of the public in a retail
store and that any objection to such a store in a residential district
arises solely from aesthetic considerations. The Court then assumes
that such considerations are "disconnected entirely" not only from
the "public health" and "morals" but from "comfort" and the
"general welfare."
A review of the leading cases establishes the rule that the police
power cannot be used to promote aesthetics. But why shouldn't our
Courts consider that changing social conditions are complicating
urban life and that there is great necessity for altering legal prin-
ciples to meet those changes? In the Matter of Wulfsohn v.
Burden,37 Chief Judge Hiscock recognizes this necessity when he
says, "Of course zoning regulations are .an exercise of the police
power and as we approach the decision of this question we must
realize that the application of the police power has been greatly
extended during a comparatively recent period and that while the
fundamental rule must be observed that there is some evil existent
or reasonably to be apprehended which the police power may be
invoked to prevent and that the remedy proposed must be generally
adapted to that purpose, the limit upon conditions held to come
within this rule has been greatly enlarged. The power is not lim-
ited to regulations designed to promote public health, public morals
or public safety or to the suppression of what is offensive, dis-
orderly or unsanitary but extends to so dealing with conditions
which exist as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity."
Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court defines
the police power in Noble State Bank v. Haskell:38  "It may be
said in a general way that police power extends to all the great
public needs * * * It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned
by usage or held by the prevailing morality or strong and prepon-
derant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the pub-
lic welfare."
a sky-sign to nine feet. The Court declared that "the physical danger to the
public does not arise from the advertisements. The advertisements, announce-
ment or direction have no relation to the safety of the structure itself."
'St. Louis Gunning Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929
(1911); Ex parte Savage, 63 Tex. 285, 290 (1911); Kansas City Gunning
Co. v. Kansas City, 240 Mo. 659, 144 S. W. 1086 (1912) ; Horton v. Old Colony
Bill Posting Co., 35 R. I. 507, 86 Atl. 314 (1914).
m261 Ill. 16, 103 N. E. 609 (1913).
-241 N. Y. 288, 150 N. E. 524 (1925).
'219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911).
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The police power is not static but progressive. It moves with
the movement of public opinion.3 9 The time has come when the
Courts should drop the mask of an exclusive concern for safety and
health and frankly approve reasonable regulation of the use of
property in the interests 40 of beauty.
ROSE L. LIPMAN.
NEGLIGENCE-MAINTENANCE OF ELECTRIC WIRES.
One creating a possible danger is under a duty to take all possible
precautions to insure the safety of those who might be in the vicinity
engaged in an act which could be reasonably anticipated. Electricity of
high voltage is inherently dangerous. Very little knowledge of its qual-
ities is possessed by the average layman. Within the past few decades
an increasing amount of litigation has arisen concerning electricity.
The carrying of electric current throtigh wires strung upon poles along
streets and highways has added to the danger of our already complex
life. Electrical companies, while not insurers of the absolute safety
of the public against all dangers arising from the lawful erection and
maintenance of their lines 1 are bound to exercise reasonable care in
the maintenance thereof.2 While some states require a high degree
of care, the law in this State seems to be that "where potentiality of
injury from electric current exists, reasonable care requires only fore-
sight apparently commensurate with the danger." 3
In a recent New York Court of Appeals case 4 the defendant
had acquired by deed a right of way across the grantor's property to
erect and to maintain high tension electric wires. The grantor's suc-
cessor erected a railroad siding running diagonally under defendant's
wires. At the expense of the railroad the wires were raised to a
height of twenty-nine and one-half feet above the siding. Subse-
quently a contractor began to construct a roadway nearby. A mov-
able crane with a boom forty feet in height was stationed near to or
at the crossing. It was used to lift materials from cars standing upon
the siding. All realized the danger of the boom forming a contact
with the wires. The defendant had notice. The contractor had
notice. The defendant did not refuse to erect higher poles but
insisted that the contractor pay for the change. The latter refused.
'Supra note 24.
10 Ibid.
'W. U. Tel. Co. v. Thorn, 64 Fed. 287 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1894).
'Ibid.; N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co. v. Bennett, 62 N. J. L. 742, 42 AtI. 759
(1899) ; JOYCE, ELECTRIC LAW (1900) §438.3 Van Leet v. Kilmer, 252 N. Y. 454, 169 N. E. 644 (1930).
'Buell v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 259 N. Y. 443, 182 N. E. 77 (1932).
